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MINORS' RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS: DOES IT EXTEND
TO COMMITMENT TO MENTAL INSTITUTIONS?
I. Introduction
Currently, many states allow a minor to be committed to a mental institu-
tion for an indefinite period upon the request of a parent and the approval of a
doctor. The usual statutory scheme provides for "voluntary" commitment of
minors, i.e., commitment under the procedures which are applicable to adults
who consciously choose to seek admission to an institution. Procedures under
voluntary admissions statutes are considerably more relaxed than under those
applicable to involuntary commitment.
Under West Virginia law,' for example, anyone who is mentally ill or
manifests symptoms of mental illness can be admitted to a mental hospital under
their "voluntary" scheme. An additional requirement of an evaluation and
recommendation for admission by a mental health facility is imposed for those
under the age of 18. For involuntary commitment on the other hand, many
procedural safeguards are affected, such as the opportunity to be heard, the
appointment of an attorney, the opportunity to testify, present witnesses and
cross-examine witnesses, the right to an examination by an independent expert,
the privilege of protection from being compelled to testify against oneself and
the application of rules of evidence.' Under West Virginia law this scheme of
procedural due process applies to all adults and minors who are 12 years old
or older and who do not consent to commitment. Some states, however, apply
the "voluntary" commitment procedures to all minors.3 Typically, then, many
minors are afforded virtually no due process when subject to commitment
proceedings.
The law presumes that the parent sufficiently represents the interests of the
minor so that procedural due process is not necessary to protect the child. Thus,
due process is often lacking irrespective of whether the child agrees with the
propriety of the commitment. Similarly, the presence of real or potential parental
interests which weigh in favor of commitment, although contrary to the best
interests of the child, fail to prompt the requirement of procedural safeguards.
The legal theory which supports this is a combination of substituted consent and
a waiver of due process requirements by the adult seeking to commit the child."
Under this theory, because of his or her age, the minor is presumed legally in-
competent to consent to medical treatment. Because of this presumed in-
competency, the parent5 can consent to "voluntary" institutionalization for the
child. The formalities required for this are no more than those requisite to con-
sent to a surgical operation for the child. That is, as where parental permission
is substituted for the minor's own permission to perform surgery, no due process
I W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-4-1 to 27-4-3 (Supp. 1976).
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4 (Supp. 1976).
3 E.g.. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.465 (Supp. 1976).
4 Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1045 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
5 For purposes of brevity, "parent" has been used throughout this note to mean parent,
guardian or person in loco parentis.
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is afforded the child. Due process is deemed unnecessary by the law because
parents, or the parents in conjunction with a doctor, by consenting to the con-
finement are presumed to have waived the child's right to due process.
This statutory scheme for "voluntary" civil commitment of minors assumes
that the child's interests are adequately represented by the parents. Recently,
this assumption and the constitutionality of these statutes have been challenged
in federal court: Bartley v. Kremens' was decided in 1975, and the Supreme
Court has noted probable jurisdiction on appeal; J.L. v. Parham' was decided
by a three-judge federal court this year. Both of these cases struck down as un-
constitutional "voluntary" commitment for minors.8
The task of deciding whether to afford due process to children faced with
commitment involves a balancing of somewhat conflicting interests. On the
one hand is the parents' interest in maintaining their judicially recognized right
to control the rearing of their children. Offsetting this is the child's interest in
maintaining his or her liberty. In determining which interest is paramount,
several areas must be explored: first, the scope of the parental privilege in raising
children; second, a definition of the child's interests and who can appropriately
represent them; third, judicial precedent for distinguishing parental interests
from children's interests; fourth, the Supreme Court's attitude towards children's
rights; and, finally, the conclusions drawn by the two federal courts which have
recently dealt with this precise issue.
II. The Scope of Parental Privilege
A. The Development of the Privilege
The strongest argument espoused by opponents of due process for minors
prior to commitment is based upon the immunity of the family unit from state
interference. Recently, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of parental
privilege in Wisconsin v. Yoder.' Yoder involved the question of whether parents
of Amish children could remove them from school for religious reasons at age
14, in violation of state law which required that they continue to attend until age
16. The Court, in holding for the parents, stressed the importance of parental
authority:
The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition. 0
This theme is echoed throughout our case law in a variety of factual situations.
For example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,1 the Supreme Court struck down a
6 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
7 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
8 See notes 66-83 infra and accompanying text.
9 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
10 Id. at 232.
11 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
statute which required parents to send their children to public schools, thereby
precluding their attendance at parochial schools. The Court referred to "[t]he
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control."' 2 In further reference to the child, the court stated:
"[t]hose who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.""
In another application of the parental prerogative to direct the lives of
their minor children, the Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. New York 4 upheld the
constitutionality of a New York criminal obscenity statute. This law prohibited
the sale of "obscene" materials to minors under the age of 17. The materials
were defined as obscene on the basis of their appeal to these minors, regardless
of whether they would be considered obscene for adults. The Court affirmed
that it is "basic in the structure of our society" that parents have authority in
their own household to direct the raising of their children. 5
The logic of this judicial "hands-off" policy with respect to family affairs is
illustrated by People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson. 6 In this case the New York Court
of Appeals declined jurisdiction to settle a dispute between parents over the ed-
ucation of their child. The parents were on good terms otherwise, and were
living together. In its decision the court stressed that the majority of matters
concerning the rearing of children must of necessity be "left to the conscience,
patience and self restraint' of the parents. The court recognized that unman-
ageable difficulties would result from judges' attempts to instruct parents on
how to raise their children.
If parents can be told by courts whether their children need to be institu-
tionalized for mental health care, how far can this be extended? Could the
state not likewise determine that the child's right to liberty demands a due process
hearing before the child can be enrolled in a military academy or a boarding
school? These fears prompt vigorous resistance to attempts to require due
process before civil commitment of minors.
Yoder and Ginsberg, then, illustrate the current vitality of the notion of
family immunity from state interference as set out in Pierce. Sisson illustrates the
necessity of such a policy in light of the limitations on our judicial system. How-
ever, the ban on such state interference is not absolute.
B. Limitations on Parental Rights
While judicial non-interference in family affairs is the general view taken
by courts, parental control is not unlimited. Under certain circumstances the
courts have recognized that children must be protected from their parents by the
state. These circumstances include extremely poor mental, moral or physical
conditions in the home environment."8 Statutes dealing with parental neglect
12 Id. at 534-35.
13 Id. at 535.
14 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
15 Id. at 639.
16 271 N.Y. 285, 2 N.E.2d 660 (1936).
17 Id. at 287, 2 N.E.2d at 661.
18 Id.
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of children exemplify legitimate state intervention into family authority."
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized the states' right to super-
sede parental authority in order to save a child's life. This state right has been
upheld despite the parents' conflicting first amendment right to freedom of
religion. Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital20 involved a situation
where parents refused to consent to life-saving medical treatment for their
children. The basis for their refusal was their right to freely exercise their
religion, and their right to raise their children according to the tenets of that re-
ligion. Despite the first amendment right to freedom of religion which sup-
ported the parents' position, the court nonetheless held that the state was
justified in intervening.
Thus, in Jehovah's Witnesses two basic rights of parents, freedom of religion
and the traditional right to control the development of one's own children, were
insufficient to override the state's interest. In the case of "voluntary" commitment
for minors, there is no constitutional right of parents comparable to that asserted
in Jehovah's Witnesses which must be balanced with the minor's constitutional
right to due process. Since the parents have less support for their assertion that
due process is not proper where civil commitment of minors is involved, it
appears that the state interest should prevail. However, civil commitment may
be distinguished from the situation in Jehovah's Witnesses in that commitment
does not involve a situation in which the child's life is in immediate danger. But
this distinction has been rendered ineffectual by another Supreme Court case,
Prince v. Massachusetts.2'
In Prince, after noting that parents and guardians have wide discretion in
the raising of their children, the Court upheld the conviction of the child's
guardian. The guardian had been charged with a violation of a Massachusetts
statute which forbade child labor: she had allowed the child to sell religious
literature on the streets. The Court found the state's interests in protecting the
child paramount to the guardian's right to raise her child in her religious faith.
The state interest in protecting the child from labor is certainly of lesser import
than protecting the child's life. The ramifications of having been institution-
alized for even a short period can be felt for a lifetime.2 While the child's interest
in a commitment proceeding is not as great as life itself, it seems to deserve more
consideration than the interest protected by the Court in Prince.
Thus, while the courts have been careful to defer to parental authority in the
rearing of their children, there have been exceptions to this general rule. To
protect the life and health of the child, and to prevent child labor, the courts
have allowed the state to interfere. When the very serious implications of civil
commitment are considered, it seems appropriate for the courts to recognize
another limited exception to traditional parental autonomy in decision-making.
19 E.g., W. VA. CoDz ANN. § 49-6-5 (1976).
20 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
21 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
22 See notes 25-26 infra and accompanying text.
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III. The Child's Interests and Appropriate Representation
A. The Minor's Interests Defined
In commitment proceedings, what are the interests of the child which need
protection? Can the parent alone, or in conjunction with the doctor, adequately
represent these interests? If not, why not? These are some of the questions which
must be answered before a determination can be made as to whether due process
is so essential that one of the infrequent exceptions to the long tradition of
parental rights must be made.
Undeniably, the minor has an interest in his or her own liberty. Un-
fortunately, substantial loss of liberty follows commitment in most cases. Many
state institutions are little more than warehouses: the deplorable conditions and
lack of treatment offered in these institutions for the mentally handicapped have
been recognized by the courts as inhumane." Furthermore, under many state
laws, a minor who is committed cannot be released until the age of majority;
earlier release is conditioned upon the consent of the individual who originally
consented to the commitment.24 Thus, the minor may be deprived of his or her
liberty for an extended period, with no recourse. The loss of liberty, the un-
certainty of release, and the inhumane conditions combine to make a decision to
commit a decision with very serious ramifications for the child.
In addition to this loss of liberty, which may continue for days, months or
years, there is another negative effect the child will suffer from having been
institutionalized. It is well documented that teachers who have read negative
psychological reports about students have lower expectations of the abilities of
the child.2" The teacher's lower expectations concerning the child's performance
determine how the teacher behaves towards the child; consequently, the child
achieves less.26 Permanent effects can be manifest on the child's learning ability
and employability. Thus, minors who are threatened with institutionalization
have interests at stake which will affect them not only for the duration of the
institutionalization, but for the rest of their lives.
Since the minor's freedom to move about may be limited for an extended
period, and his educational capacity can be irrevocably stunted, it is very im-
portant that these interests be represented vigorously in any decision-making
process involving a possible commitment. Traditionally, for reasons previously
noted, the American system of jurisprudence has looked to the parents to play
this role.
B. Parental Interests and the Decision to Seek Commitment
'There is evidence that factors influencing a parental decision to have a
child committed are not always directed toward the best interests of the child.
23 New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752,
756 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
24 E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-4-3 (Supp. 1976).
25 Mason, Teachers' Observations and Expectations of Boys and Girls as Influenced
by Biased Psychological Reports and Knowledge of the Effects of Bias, 65 No. 2 J. ED. PsYcH.
238 (1973).
26 Id. at 241.
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Even with the greatest desire to aid the mentally ill child, the parents may en-
counter very difficult problems.2 7 One obvious and important consideration is
the development of other children in the family. Their anger, hostility and
feeling of deprivation when they are not able to bring their friends home or to
live normally in their own home, due to the presence of a disturbed child, is
certain to have an influence on a parental decision to seek commitment. " Ad-
ditionally, society often holds the parents of an emotionally disturbed child
partially or totally responsible for the child's condition. This fact, and its result-
ing burden of guilt, may prompt a parent to endeavor to remove the child from
his or her daily presence. 9
Furthermore, in some states, once a child has been hospitalized for mental
illness, release is not allowed without the consent of the parent. Even where this
is not a legal prerequisite, parental willingness to accept the child's return plays a
role in an institution's decision to release a minor patient. Unfortunately, it ap-
pears that parents frequently indicate little desire to receive the child back into
the home. Thus, a child could be institutionalized for years longer than is thera-
peutically necessary, due to parental decision-making. It is clear then, that
parental authority is very much open to abuse: under the guise of admitting a
child to a mental hospital parents may actually be abandoning their child to the
state.2 0
From this evidence, it is apparent that the very serious decision of the
parent to pursue institutionalization for the minor child, because that child
allegedly suffers from mental illness, is in great need of some kind of check. One
obvious source of an advocate for the minor is the medical community.
C. Suitability of the Doctor as an Advocate for the Child
Most statutes dealing with "voluntary" commitment of minors require that
a doctor agree to the institutionalization before the child can be admitted." Un-
fortunately, like the parents', the doctor's motives in advising institutionalization
have become suspect. There is a question of whom the psychiatrist represents: the
child, the parents, or the institution.2 The doctor is generally employed by
either the institution or the parents. In the latter case, it is usually for the purpose
of supporting the parental desire to have the child committed. Therefore, the
doctor cannot impartially represent the child's best interests. Additionally,
doctors have been found to represent the parents' interests regardless of who has
hired them. Frequently, the minor becomes such a disruption to home life that
the parents feel they can no longer cope with the child. Under these circum-
27 H. Lovp, PARENTAL ATTITUDES TowARD EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 19 (1970).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 114.
30 J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 138 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
31 E.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 72.23.070 (Supp. 1975).
32 Shestack, Psychiatry and the Dilemma of Dual Loyalties in MEDICAL, MORAL AND
LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 7-17 (Ayd ed. 1974); Robitscher, Implementing
the Rights of the Mentally Disabled: judicial, Legislative and Psychiatric Action, in MEDICAL,
MORAL AND LnowAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARP 145 (Ayd ed. 1974).
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stances, the doctor will sometimes recommend institutionalization although this
drastic measure is not required by the child's condition."
It has been suggested that the best solution to this problem is to appoint
both counsel and a psychiatrist to represent the child's interests. 4 Neither of
these professionals would be paid by the institution or the parents. They would
therefore be free to explore the alternatives available to the child. If it became
evident to them that the parents' motive for seeking institutionalization was to
remove from the home a child they felt they could no longer cope with, the
professionals could take this into account. It is unlikely, under these circum-
stances, that placing the child back into the home would be in anyone's best
interests. However, the child's condition may not be such that institutionalization
is necessary. The role of the professional advocates, then, would be to examine
such alternatives as foster homes, or group care homes, which are located in the
community and are generally less restrictive of the minor's liberty.
Social science arguments point to this scheme as a solution, but it remains to
be determined whether it is legally supportable. A discussion of cases wherein
the necessity of distinguishing the interests of the child from those of the parent
was seen and implemented can begin to answer this question.
IV. Judicial Recognition of the Child's Distinct Interests
Even where a child's life or health is not in danger, courts have, in limited
cases, recognized the necessity of separating the interests of children from those
of their parents. Ellis v. Massenburg"5 is an example of such a case. In
Ellis, an infant's parent was a nominal plaintiff in a suit to set aside a
deed: the infant was a defendant in the same suit. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that it was error to allow that parent to represent his child's
interests, as a court appointed guardian ad litem. The parent had disclaimed
all interest in the suit and represented that the use of his name as plaintiff was
not authorized. Though the court found no evidence of bad faith, it determined
that it was essential that the child have representation apart from that provided
by his parent. The court held that if a guardian has any interest at all in a suit,
that interest must be entirely consistent with that of his ward. Even a mere
colorable interest must cause a disqualification if it is at all adverse.
Similarly, in White v. Osborn 6 the lower court appointed a guardian ad
litem to represent a child whose interests conflicted with those of his parents.
The child was awarded a judgment for a physical injury which he had suffered.
Since his father paid the medical bills, the child was indebted to his father for a
fraction of the judgment. When a portion of the judgment was available for
collection from the court clerk, the father attempted to collect this entire amount
and apply it to his son's medical debt. The clerk felt that the father should be
allowed to collect for himself only his pro rata share of the amount available for
collection. In the resulting lawsuit, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
33 J.L. v. Parham, supra note 30, at 134.
34 Shestack, supra note 32, at 13.
35 126 N.C. 129, 35 S.E. 240 (1900).
36 251 N.C. 56, 110 S.E.2d 449 (1959).
[October 19761
[Vol. 52:136]
due to the father's obvious conflict of interests, it was improper for him to be
allowed to represent the infant for purposes of collection of the judgment. The
court separated the interest of the child from that of the parent, although it
found that no error had been committed when the lower court allowed the father
to represent his son during litigation.
In a factual situation closer to the commitment procedures discussed here,
the District of Columbia Municipal Court of Appeals likewise acknowledged that
the best interests of the child are not consistently represented by the parent. Thus,
in In re Sippy'7 the court recognized that when the state's power is invoked for
involuntary commitment of a minor, the child should have representation inde-
pendent of her parent's counsel. In this case a 17-year-old woman was ordered
committed for an indefinite period of time to a school where she would receive
psychiatric treatment. Her mother had filed a complaint with the Juvenile Court
charging that her daughter was habitually out of her control. The daughter
argued against the necessity or propriety of the commitment. On appeal the
court found that it was prejudicial to allow an attorney who presented himself
to the court as representing the mother's interests to also enter an appearance on
behalf of the daughter. Additionally, the court held that any waiver of her
daughter's rights by the mother was ineffective; the antagonistic position of the
mother prevented her from effectively waiving her daughter's doctor-patient
privilege.38
The court was aware that parent and child in fact had opposing interests
which demanded recognition in order for the minor to be adequately represented.
Consequently, the court required that the minor have independent representation
and refused to allow the mother to waive privileges for her daughter. Despite the
traditional role of the parent as proper advocate for the child, the court had no
apparent difficulty in ordering an aberration from that norm under these
circumstances.
Finally, in a 1973 case, Horacek v. Exon,"9 which challenged conditions in
a state institution for the mentally retarded, a United States District Court con-
sidered the question of whether parents were proper parties to represent their
children's interests. The court stated:
I cannot be insensitive to the possibility that the interests of the parents
may conflict with those of the children.... While the parents in all good
conscience may desire one remedy, or a specific type or style of treatment
for their children, it would not necessarily be in the best interests of the
children.40
Therefore the court thought it would be wise to provide for appointment of a
guardian ad litem who would not replace the parents as representatives of their
37 97 A.2d 455 '(D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953).
38 Furthermore, the appeals court found that the daughter's right of confrontation and
her right to have witnesses sworn before testifying were denied due to the informal nature of
the commitment hearing. "In a case like this where liberty is involved, we think a respondent
is entitled to insist that the facts be presented by witnesses who are under the solemnity of
an oath." Id. at 458.
39 357 F. Supp. 71 (D. Neb. 1973).
40 Id. at 74.
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children, but would be charged with recognizing potential and actual differences
in interests asserted by the parents, and interests that needed to be asserted on
behalf of the children.4
Thus, in Horacek and other lower court cases the parental right to control
the raising of children has been necessarily eroded. A strong possibility of con-
flict of interests has been enough, in some cases, to convince courts to separate
the interests of parent and child. The extension of this acknowledgement of the
distinct interests of parent and child to all cases of civil commitment seems ad-
visable. That a conflict of interests exists is well documented. 2 The appointment
of medical and legal advocates to fully and vigorously represent the child whose
liberty is at stake is an appropriate means of ensuring that the child's interests
are given full judicial consideration.
Individual rights of minors have in recent years received much attention
from the Supreme Court. A brief survey of cases recognizing a host of constitu-
tional rights is essential to a determination of the legal propriety of affording
minors due process in civil commitment proceedings.
V. Children's Constitutional Rights and the Supreme Court
A. In Re Gault: Due Process in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings
The watershed decision in the area of minors' rights is In re Gault,"
decided by the Supreme Court in 1966. In this case a 15-year-old boy was
accused, in a verbal complaint, of making obscene phone calls. As a result, two
hearings were held. At these hearings no witnesses were sworn, and the accusing
witnesses were not present. Furthermore, the juvenile's parents were not
notified of the hearings, no record of either hearing was maintained, and there
was no notification of a right to counsel. As a result of this informal process,
Gault was committed as a juvenile delinquent to the state industrial school for the
duration of his minority: a time amounting to six years.
The Court described the development of the juvenile court movement from
its origins at the end of the nineteenth century. The movement arose in reaction
to the horror of adult penalties and procedures, and the intermingling of
hardened criminals with children in both courts and prisons. In its beginnings
the movement sought to promote the best interests of the juvenile by securing
treatment and rehabilitation rather than punishment for the child.44 The Court
noted, however, that the results of the juvenile system have not been wholly
satisfactory: "Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled
discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for
principle and procedure."4 "
The realities of the situation were emphasized by the Court: solely because
he was under eighteen years of age, the defendant was subject to a long period
41 Id.
42 See, notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
43 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
44 Id. at 17.
45 Id. at 18.
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of confinement. The Court noted the irony of the fact that had Gault been
eighteen years old, the maximum punishment for making obscene phone calls
would have been a fifty-dollar fine and two months of imprisonment.46 It was
insignificant, the Court felt, that the institution to which Gault was committed
was called a "school" rather than a "prison." The institutional hours, regimen-
tation and whitewashed walls to which the defendant would be confined for
six years amounted to incarceration and serious loss of liberty."7 The Court called
the prospect of a determination of juvenile delinquency "awesome" since such
a determination carries with it the possibility of incarceration until age 21.8
With respect to the right to counsel, the Court stated:
A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be
"delinquent" and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable
in seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juvenile needs the assistance of
counsel...9
It was further noted by the Court that a probation officer who is also the ar-
resting officer-initiating the proceedings, testifying against the child, etc.,
cannot act as counsel for the juvenile; neither can the judge represent the child.5"
The Court found that due process was unjustifiably denied the defendant
simply because he was a juvenile: "Under our Constitution, the condition of
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."'"
The parallels between juvenile delinquency proceedings and "voluntary"
commitment for minors are rife: an extended confinement, whitewashed walls,
regimentation and institutional hours are all equally present in mental institu-
tions. The child who is subjected to commitment proceedings is also denied due
process solely because of his or her minority. The presence of all of these ele-
ments in civil "voluntary" commitment for minors points to the necessity for
due process in this situation, as it did in Gault.
Additionally, in Gault, the Court rejected the argument that because it
is acting in the best interests of the individual, the state can justify proceedings
which do not conform to those applicable to criminal proceedings. The Supreme
Court refused to distinguish between juvenile and criminal proceedings with
respect to due process. It is the loss of liberty which triggers due process, the
Court determined, not the character of the action. This thinking can be ap-
plied to civil commitments to mental hospitals as well, given the severe loss of
liberty involved.52
A final factual similarity between Gault and "voluntary" commitment of
minors is worthy of consideration, i.e., the role of the doctor in civil commitment
46 Id. at 27-29.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 36.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 28.
52 Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968). "It is the likelihood of in-
voluntary incarceration-whether for punishment as an adult for a crime, rehabilitation as ajuvenile for delinquency, or treatment and training as a feeble-minded or mental incompetent
-which commends observance of the constitutional safeguards of due process."
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and the role of the corrections officer in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In
both cases these persons may initiate the proceedings, or cause them to be initi-
ated, and both may testify against the juvenile. As the Court found that the pro-
bation officer cannot represent the child's best interests, it can be argued equally
well that the doctor cannot represent the juvenile's best interests. As previously
noted,53 the doctor hired by the institution or the parents may testify against the
minor. The physician who is an integral part of the commitment process, as
required by law, should be precluded from representing the minor under the
pretense of being an adequate advocate for the child's rights.
In sum, Gault is monumental precedent for those who assert a minor's con-
stitutional right to due process prior to commitment to a mental institution. The
important factual parallels and the applicability of the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Gault to the civil commitment of minors argues strongly for the imposition
of similar procedural safeguards to commitment of minors.
B. Tinker and Goss: More Constitutional Rights for Minors
The Supreme Court has consistently confirmed its holding in Gault that
children cannot be denied constitutional rights because of their minority. In
1969 the Court decided Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community4
School District, in which it recognized minor students' first amendment rights.
Three children wore black armbands to school, in protest of the Vietnam war,
and consequently were suspended from school. The Supreme Court upheld the
first amendment rights of the students and stated: "Students in school as well as
out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of funda-
mental rights which the State must respect.... ."" If a child's right to freedom
of speech is considered fundamental by the Court, surely that person's liberty is
no less fundamental and no less entitled to protection.
Another key case which bolsters minors' claims to constitutional protections
is Goss v. Lopez, 6 decided by the Supreme Court in 1975. Here several public
school students were suspended from school for misconduct for periods of up to
10 days. The punishment was administratively determined without a hearing.
A class action was filed against the school officials, seeking a declaration that the
Ohio statute permitting such suspensions was unconstitutional, and also asking
for an order enjoining the officials to remove from the students' records any
reference to the suspensions. The Supreme Court affirmed the federal three-
judge court which had held for the plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court found that the students, though suspended for only a
few days, had significant interests at stake which were deserving of the protections
of due process:
The total exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial
period, and certainly if the suspension is for 10 days, is a serious event in
53 See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text.
54 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
55 Id. at 511.
56 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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the life of the suspended child. Neither the property interest in educational
benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in reputation, which is
also implicated, is so insubstantial that suspensions may constitutionally be
imposed by any procedure the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary.5 7
In elaborating on the liberty interest in reputation, the Court emphasized that if
the charges against the students were sustained and recorded, the students'
standing with their friends and teachers would be seriously damaged, and the
incident would diminish their opportunities in the fields of higher education and
employment."'
Again, there are important parallels between the case of the "voluntarily"
committed child, and the students in Goss. Both have important reputational
interests: children institutionalized in mental hospitals suffer from severe
stigma.59 The effects of this stigma are often more severe than those discussed in
Goss, and clearly include negative expectations of teachers and possible em-
ployers." Indeed, the combination of this social stigma, and the possibility of
confinement for years, involves a substantially greater liberty interest. If due
process is mandated for short-term school suspensions, it is certainly an anomaly
that due process is not afforded juveniles whose parents seek to commit them to
mental institutions.
One additional statement made by the Court in Goss constitutes an in-
portant argument in favor of due process for children who are facing commit-
ment. It is evident that the Court felt due process would not protect minors from
suspensions which were warranted, but instead, would protect both the state's
and the child's interests from erroneous suspensions. "The concern would be
mostly academic," the Supreme Court felt, "if the disciplinary process were a
totally accurate, unerring process, never mistaken and never unfair. Unfortu-
nately, that is not the case, and no one suggests that it is." 6"
The inaccuracy of the commitment process, as well as the difficulties in
obtaining a discharge, are well documented. 2 To deprive a child of his or her
liberty to the extent involved in commitment without taking every precaution to
assure the accuracy of a determination to commit appears to be a direct affront
to the Supreme Court's decision in Goss. Indeed, the Court has clearly indicated
time and again that the condition of being a child is not a sufficient rationale
for depriving a person of due process.
C. Danforth: Current Supreme Court Consideration of Minors' Rights
Most recently, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional rights of
57 Id. at 576.
58 Id. at 575.
59 In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ; Matthews v. Hardy, .420 F.2d 607,
611 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
60 Mason, supra note 25; Whatley, Social Attitudes Toward Discharged Mental Patients
in THE MENTAL PATIENT: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 401 (Spitzer & Senzin
eds. 1968).
61 419 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1975).
62 Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973). Reprinted in
13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 379 '(1973); Kay, Legal Planning for the Mentally Retarded: The
California Experience, 60 CAL. L. REV. 438, 457-67 (1972).
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minors in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.13 In striking
down as unconstitutional a Missouri law which contained a blanket provision
requiring all unmarried women under the age of 18 who desired an abortion to
obtain parental consent, the Supreme Court stated:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess Constitutional rights.6'
In Danforth, the arguments for upholding the constitutionality of parental
consent were some of the same ones espoused by opponents of due process for
minors threatened with commitment to mental institutions: family unity and
preservation of parental authority.65 The Court was unconvinced by these argu-
ments, determining that any interest which the parent might have in the termina-
tion of the minor's pregnancy was subservient to the right of a competent minor
who was mature enough to become pregnant.66
Danforth again illustrates the willingness of the Court to separate the rights
of the child from those of the parent. This case is distinguishable from civil com-
mitment in that not all minors subject to institutionalization are mature and
competent. Nevertheless, Danforth stands for the proposition that the minor's
voice in his or her future is important, and should be treated as such. The im-
plication for civil commitment is that the minor's interests should be represented,
whether by the child or an advocate, and seriously considered in any decision to
effect institutionalization. In Danforth, the Court once again concluded that the
constitutional rights of the minor must prevail.
While the Supreme Court has not dealt squarely with the problem of afford-
ing minors due process in commitment procedures, two United States District
Courts have recently done so. In performing a similar balancing procedure, these
courts have come to the same conclusion: the constitutional rights of minors
must prevail over parental interests.
VI. Lower Court Treatment of Due Process Rights for Minors Subject
to Civil Commitment
Both Pennsylvania67 and Georgia 8 statutes which allowed "voluntary"
commitment of minors have been declared unconstitutional by three-judge
courts: the former in Bartley v. Kremens,69 the latter in J.L. v. Parham.° In
Bartley, the court found that the state is required, generally, to provide sub-
stantial procedural protections when there is a possibility that a person will be
63 44 U.S.L.W. 5197 (U.S. July 1, 1976).
64 Id. at 5204.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Act. No. 6 (P.L. 96) art. IV §§ 402-03 1966 Special Sess. (codified as PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, §§ 4402-03 (1969)).
68 Ga. Laws 1969, No. 365 § 88-503.1, p. 517 (codified as GA. CoDa ANN. § 88-503.1
(1971)).
69 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
70 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
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erroneously and wrongfully deprived of liberty through commitment to a mental
institution. Furthermore, the court found that this possibility of error was quite
substantial in civil commitment. The court cited instances in which individuals
had been committed for inappropriate reasons, including: difficulty in relating
to one parent; so that the rest of the family could vacation; poor family situa-
tions, e.g., where there was fear that the mother would have another nervous
breakdown; running away; robbing a gas station; physical ailments; delinquent
behavior; and a variety of other equally inappropriate and insufficient reasons.
In light of these circumstances the court found that:
The child who faces the possibility of being physically confined for an
indeterminate period with all of the ramifications of such confinement clearly
has an interest within the contemplation of the liberty and property
language of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7'
The state had argued that: (1) the purpose of the act was to rehabilitate
the child rather than to punish by incarceration, thus the state is acting as
parens patriae, and, consequently, no procedural due process is appropriate;
(2) if due process applies, in the interest of protecting family unity, the court
should consider any due process rights fulfilled by the statute; (3) since
parents must set the machinery for commitment in motion, they effectively waive
any due process rights of the children.7 2
The court remained unpersuaded by any and all of these arguments. First,
the court found that, despite the protective motives of the state, due process is
required before a person can be deprived of liberty.7" The court did not discuss
the state's second argument, but, from the conclusions the court drew, it is ap-
parent that it felt the statute's process was inadequate. The opinion made
it clear that it is irrelevant whether the proceeding is civil or criminal, or whether
the subject matter is juvenile delinquency or mental illness. The critical factor
in deciding whether due process applies is the presence of a likelihood of in-
voluntary confinement. 4
The court continued in its rationale for demanding due process by citing
Gault for the proposition that due process is necessary for a determination of the
truth from conflicting data. Gault was also cited for the notion that due process
is instrumental in protecting against wrongful commitment regardless of whether
the state's purpose is benevolent or punitive.
Finally, the court answered the state's third argument by stating that, while
ideally parents always have the child's best interests in mind when making
decisions affecting the future of their child, reality falls short of the ideal. There-
fore, the court concluded, parents may not waive the child's right to due process
absent a showing that the child's interests have been fully and vigorously repre-
sented."5
71 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1046 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
72 Id. at 1044-45.
73 Id. at 1045 n.7.
74 Id. at 1046.
75 The court held that:
[B]efore they may be institutionalized plaintiffs and others of their class are entitled
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The court determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to due process similar
to that afforded in criminal proceedings. This specifically included the right to
a hearing and counsel. Since the Pennsylvania statute failed to provide these
protections to minors, the court declared it unconstitutional.76
Similarly, in J.L. v. Parham," a class action filed by two minors contending
that they had been deprived of their right to procedural due process, a three-
judge district court in Georgia held that the state's "voluntary" commitment
statute for minors was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs contended that their
constitutional rights were denied when they were confined without having had
a meaningful chance to be heard. Additionally, the plaintiffs complained that
alternate treatment facilities which would have been less restrictive of their liberty
were never explored. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the statute unconstitu-
tionally allowed their parents to effect their involuntary commitment through
the use of "voluntary" procedures."8
The defendant asserted that pursuant to the statute the state is merely
acting as parens patriae. The purpose of the statute, the defendant argued, is
merely to assist parents in the performance of their traditional duty to provide
for and nurture their children. 9 Therefore, it amounts to no more than a
statutory confirmation of the freedom parents enjoy to raise their children as
they desire. Pierce and Yoder were cited to support this argument.80 It was
further suggested by the defendant that the statute merely affords parents the
authority they need to hospitalize their children, and consequently provides all
the due process that the circumstances require.
The court viewed the statute differently. It felt that the statute gave parents
the power to capriciously admit their children to mental hospitals for an un-
determined length of time, and held that it is essential for the state to provide due
process when it undertakes to act as parens patriae. A necessary part of this due
process is procedural protections to ensure that parents do not abuse their power
to institutionalize their children." The court's view was bolstered by the fact
that the defendant conceded that there are a considerable number of people
who still treat mental hospitals as "dumping grounds."8 2
The court was also troubled by the provision in the statute which mandated
that the superintendent discharge any voluntary patient who had recovered or
to (1) a probable cause hearing within seventy-two (72) hours from the date of their
initial detention; (2) a post-commitment hearing within two (2) weeks from the
date of their initial detention; (3) written notice, including the date, time, and
place of the hearing, and a statement of the grounds for the proposed commitment;
(4) counsel at all significant stages of the commitment process and if indigent the
right to appointment of free counsel; (5) be present at all hearings concerning their
proposed commitment; (6) a finding by clear and convincing proof that they are in
need of institutionalization; "(7) the rights to confront and to cross-examine witnesses
against them, to offer evidence in their own behalf, and to offer testimony of
witnesses.
Id. at 1053.
76 See note 68 supra.
77 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
78 Id. at 118.
79 Id. at 137.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 138.
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improved to the point that the superintendent found that hospitalization was no
longer desirable. The application of this part of the statute to children was mere
illusion. In reality, children were not released unless there was a parent ready,
willing and able to accept the child back. A determination was also made by the
court that the lack of such a ready, willing and able parent was not uncommon. 3
Consequently, many children were institutionalized who no longer required
such treatment. This, the court felt, was a deprivation of liberty which violated
the due process rights of minors.
In light of these findings and the Supreme Court's decision in Gault
requiring due process for minors subject to juvenile delinquency proceedings,
the court in Parham held the "voluntary" commitment statute unconstitutional
as applied to minors. The court found that though the state purports to act as
parens patriae, it has an inescapable obligation to guarantee due process."
The court continued to find that neither doctors nor parents could be relied
upon to fully represent the child's interests; the former because psychiatry is an
inexact science,85 and doctors can make errors, and the latter because their
motives do not coincide, in every case, with the child's best interests.86
VII. Conclusion
Thus, in weighing the interests of parents and children, two federal courts
have recently come to the conclusion that, despite the traditional scope of
parental authority, the only suitable protection from error in the civil commit-
ment process is procedural due process, including an opportunity to be heard and
present a defense. These safeguards must apply to children as well as to adults.
Bartley, Horacek and Parham taken together constitute part of the developing
body of law dealing with substituted consent which makes it abundantly clear
that parents may not waive the constitutional rights of their children absent a
showing that the child's interests are being fully and vigorously represented.8
The child has very important interests at stake: not only the loss of liberty,
possibly until the age of majority, but also the stigma of having been institu-
tionalized. While it is difficult for the parents to protect these interests, it is also
undesirable to assume that the doctor who is hired by the parents or institution
will fully represent the child's interests. Independent representation for the minor
is essential to promote accuracy in the commitment process.
The sum of the Supreme Court decisions in Gault, Tinker, Danforth and
Goss indicate a recent emphasis by the Court on the importance of minors' con-
stitutional rights. In light of these cases, when the Supreme Court decides a case
like Bartley or Parham, the result should be an affirmation of children's right to
due process.
Linda M. Olivieri
83 Id. at 135.
84 Id. at 138.
85 Rosenhan, supra note 62.
86 The court did not set out specific procedures which must be followed in order to comply
with due process requirements. The court held only that some due process is necessary and
ordered that, within 60 days, proceedings must commence in the juvenile courts for those
children detained under the unconstitutional commitment statute.
87 Accord, New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp.
752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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